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Abstract 
We start by defining an approach to non-monotonic prob­
abilistic reasoning in terms of non-monotonic categorical 
reasoning. We identify a type of non-monotonic proba­
bilistic reasoning, akin to default inheritance, that seems 
to be commonly found in practice. We formulate this in 
terms of the Maximization of Conditional Independence 
(MCI), and identify a variety of applications for this 
sort of default. We propose a formalization using Point­
wise Circumscription. We compare MCI to Maximum 
Entropy, another kind of non-monotonic principle , and 
conclude by raising a. number of open questions. 
1 Introduction 
Probabilistic reasoning is often rather loosely referred 
to as being non-monotonic. But how can we make 
this notion of non-monotonicity precise? In par­
ticular, what sort of non-monotonicity characterizes 
probabilistic reasoning? We will be addressing both 
of these questions in this paper. Our approach is 
to use the same definition of non-monotonicity as 
for categorical reasoning. This requires that we cast 
probabilistic reasoning in terms of categorical reason­
ing, i.e. reasoning where each sentence may only take 
on a truth value of 0 or 1. 
2 Probabilistic Logic 
A way to do so is provided by the approach of 
"Probabilistic Logic", as introduced in [15] and 
extended in [3]. 
Suppose we start with a. (finite) set A of statements 
about the probabilities of some sentences S; in a 
(categorical) logical language L+ The basic idea 
of Probabilistic Logic is to express the probabilistic 
statements A in a second logical language C.m which 
*This work was supported by the author's National Science 
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and Rockwell International under contracts N00039-83-C-0136, 
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is classical and categorical, e.g. first-order. The 
formulas of Lb are reified: they become terms in 
C.m. The connectives of Lb become functions in C.m. 
The logical properties of C.b (e.g. its tautologies) are 
encoded as a set of axioms LOGb in Lm. We can 
represent an assertion Gin Lb by an axiom P(G) = 1 
in C.m which says it holds with certainty. For example 
we can write as an axiom in LOGb: 
'v'XY.P((X 1\ (X-Y))-.Y)) = 1 
There is a subtlety, however, that eases the job of 
writing LOGb. The only formulas of Lb that we need 
to describe in l:.m are those formed (by application 
of logical connectives) from the members of the set 
:F of interpretation classes of S = { Si} . Then we 
do not need to encode in LOGb all the tautologies 
of Lb, only those of propositional logic involving 
propositions corresponding to the space W = 2F. See 
[15] for details. 
The definitional axioms of standard probability 
AXPROB, are also encoded in l:.m, e.g. 1 
P(True) = 1 
'v'XY.{P(-.(X/\Y)) = 1}=>{P{XVY) = P(X)+P(Y)} 
'v'XY.{P{Y) # O}:::}{P(XIY) = {P(X 1\ Y)/ P{Y)}} 
'v'XY.{P(X:: Y) = l}::>{P(X) = P(Y)} 
From these we can get the usual probabilistic identi­
ties, including Bayes' Theorem. 
Thus by recourse to a meta-language, probabilistic 
knowledge and reasoning can be described in terms 
of categorical logic and reasoning. 
Disclaimer: There are some kinds of probabilistic 
reasoning, notably with "higher-order" probabilities, 
which cannot. be straightforwardly formulated in the 
above way. That is, we have assumed that A contains 
statements in which there is only one level of nesting 
1cf. [5], modified so that the probability function is defined 
on propositions rather than sets 
of {probability of . . . } before reaching a proposition 
in a categorical language. However, one could apply 
our approach iteratively to express some sorts of 
second-order or higher-order probabilistic theories. 
Above, we assumed Cb was zero-th order in P. Then 
Cm was first-order in P. However, more generally, we 
could let Cb be of order n in P, and then Cm would 
be of order n + 1. 
3 Non-Monotonic Probabilistic 
Theories 
Let Th( Q) denote the closure of Q under logical 
implication in Cm. Furthermore, let 
Then Th8(A) is what [15,3] call "the" probabilistic 
theory which is probabilistically entailed by A. There 
Cm was implicitly first-order logic. 
We say A is of Type-l-ei form (terminology of [3]) 
iff it consists of axioms of the form P(S;dSs2) � 
q;, where q; is a number in the real unit interval 
[0, 1]. (Note that P(XIY) 5 r can be re-written 
equivalently as P(-.XIY) � (1 - r).) In such a 
case, Th8(A) is equivalent to a lower probability 
distribution p-(WIW) giving lower (and upper) 
bounds on all the conditional probabilities defined on 
w. 
Definition 3.1: A set operator T is monotonic iff 
Definition 3.2: A set operator T is non-monotonic 
iff it is not monotonic, i.e. iff 
Probabilistic Logic allows us to consider A to 
be a set of statements in Cm. Suppose we have 
some rule for generating the set of conclusions (in 
Cm) that we draw from A. We can then ask 
whether the set of conclusions grows monotonic­
ally as we add to A. We call this conclusion­
drawing set operation theory-closure. Th8 above 
is an example of a theory-closure operator. Logical 
(non-)monotonicity is (non-)monotonicity of theory­
closure. If T is (non-)monotonic, we say that T(B) 
is a (non-)monotonic theory. 
Definition 3.3: A sentence C in a non-monotonic 
theory T(B1) is defeasible iff 
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We also ·call a defeasible conclusion a non-monotonic 
conclusion. A monotonic conclusion is one which is 
not defeasible. Thus we can partition any theory 
T(B) into a monotonic part and a non-monotonic 
part. We will say that reasoning (inference) is mono­
tonic or non-monotonic according to whether the con­
clusions drawn are monotonic or non-monotonic. We 
write I=T for entailment of a monotonic conclusion, 
and �T for entailment of a non-monotonic conlusion. 
Definition 3.4: An update � to T(B) is non­
monotonic iff T(B) � T(B U �). 
Note that when T(A) is of Type-l-ei form, logical 
monotonicity corresponds to the functional mono­
tonicity of the equivalent p-(WIW). In other words, 
if when we add new probabilistic statments to A, the 
lower bound of every probability does not decrease, 
then the update is monotonic. If this condition is 
violated, then the update is non-monotonic. 
Probabilistic Logic as defined in [15,3] draws its 
notions of logical implication and entailment from 
classical categorical logic, in fact implicitly from first­
order logic. It is thus monotonic, since first-order 
logic is. 
However, just as classical logic can be extended 
to perform non-monotonic reasoning, so can Proba­
bilistic Logic. Thus we can represent non-monotonic 
probabilistic reasoning via non-m�notonic categorical 
reasoning in Cm. To do so will require us to adopt 
theory-closure operators different from Th8, since 
Th8 is monotonic. However,· we might want to 
include Th8 in the monotonic part of whatever non­
monotonic T we employ. Later when we define a cir­
cumscriptive approach to one kind of non-monotonic 
probabilistic reasoning, we will do just that. We 
will call the monotonic sentences (e.g. Th8(A)) hard 
information (beliefs). Relatively speaking, the non­
monotonic conclusions are soft, i.e. tentative. 
Non-monotonic probabilistic reasoning requires us 
to employ principles for drawing conclusions which 
properly extend (i.e. go beyond) the axioms of clas­
sical probability. Thus each of the types of non­
monotonic probabilistic reasoning discussed below 
takes the axioms of a classical probability as a con­
straining point of departure rather than as an equiv­
alent model. 
3.1 A Monotonic Example 
As an example of monotonic probabilistic reasoning 
using Th8 as our theory-closure operator, consider 
the case of a rather rowdy fellow named Igor. Let 
Fights denote the proposition that Igor gets in a bar 
fight; let Drunk denote the proposition that Igor has 
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more than three drinks. Suppose to begin with we 
are given (i.e. At consists of): 
P(Fights!Drunk) = .6 
?(Drunk) = .3 
Then we can infer 
At FTha {?(Fights)� .18} 
If we next learn (i.e. add to At to get A2) 
P(F,ights!--.Drunk) = .2 
then we can infer 
(1) 
A2 FTha {?(Fights)= .32} (2) 
which is consistent with, but stronger than, (1). The 
conclusions (1) and (2) are forced or determined 
by the given information in a strong sense which 
depends only on the standard axioms and definitions 
of classical probability. 
3.2 A Non-Monotonic Example 
Next we investigate an example of what appears to 
be one important type of non-monotonic probabilistic 
reasoning. Consider the case of 1985 model-year cars 
made by Neptune Corporation. Let L denote the 
proposition that a car is so severely defective that 
it mechanically breaks down in its first 1000 miles. 
Let N denote the proposition that a car's maker is 
Neptune. To begin with we are given (i.e. At consists 
of) 
P(L!N) = .1 
(No wonder you have never heard of Neptune Cor­
poration before.) Suppose we are now asked what 
is P(L!(N /\ T)), where T means the car is a Triton 
model. Th8(At) tells us nothing about the value 
of P(LI(N /\ T)): it could consistently be anything 
between 0 and 1. 
However, a commonly-found pattern of probabilis­
tic reasoning is to presume in this circumstance that 
P(LI(N /\ T)) = P(LIN) 
A variety of rationales might be offered. One is that 
as long as we have no information to the contrary, 
the best estimate of the proportion of lemons in the 
class of Neptune Tritons is to use the information 
we are given about the proportion of lemons in the 
overall class of Neptunes. Another rationale is that 
since we have no evidence that the property of being a 
Triton model is indeed relevant to whether Neptunes 
are lemons, we will presume it is irrelevant. 
93 
In effect, . 
P(LI(N /\ T)) = .1 
is adopted as a default. We are using a non­
monotonic theory-closure operator T to generate a 
non-monotonic conclusion: 
Suppose next we learn (i.e. add to At to form A2) 
P(LI(N /\ T)) = .05 (4) 
i.e. we get definitive, hard information about the 
value of P(LI(N /\ T)). (4) contradicts and overrides 
our previous non-monotonic conclusion (3): it is a 
non-monotonic update. If next we are asked what 
is P(LI(N /\ T /\ W)), where W means that the 
car is a station-wagon, our circumstance is similar 
to that above. Again, Th8 tells us nothing: only 
that P(LI(N /\ T /\ W)) may consistently take on 
any value between 0 and 1. Later, as we did in 
(4), we may get specific, hard information. In the 
meanwhile, we might apply the same sort of non­
monotonic reasoning as we performed before to get 
(3). This time there is an added complexity, though. 
We have two different pieces of hard information 
bearing on the probability of L: both are conditioned 
on classes which are more general than (N /\T /\ W)). 
Often a refinement to the above rationales is invoked: 
in cases of such competition, we choose to adopt 
the "most specific" information, i.e. the one which 
is conditional on the most specific class. So in the 
choice between 
P(HI(N /\ T /\ W)) = P(HIN); and (5) 
P(HI(N /\ T /\ W)) = P(Hj(N /\ T)) (6) 
we favor the latter. Thus we infer 
AaF::r{P(LI(N /\ T /\ W)) = .05} (7) 
Similarly, if we are asked about the probability of L 
for progressively more specific classes (e.g. by adding 
blue, air-conditioned, etc. as further conditions), we 
might employ the same pattern of non-monotonic 
reasoning to conclude from A2 that: 
P(LI(N /\ T /\ W /\Blue)) = .05, 
P(LI(N /\ T /\ W /\Blue/\ AirCond)) = .05, . . .  
4 Default Inheritance of Probabilities 
Our non-monotonic example above illustrates what 
appears to be one commonly-found type of non­
monotonic probabilistic reasoning. Now we will 
formulate the example more abstractly. 
H � - L 
c1 
� 
N -
� 
(N 1\ T) c2 -
� 
(N 1\ T 1\ W) s -
� .1 ql = 
� .05 q2 = 
A2 consisted exactly of: 
P(HIC1) = 
P(HIC2) = 
while LOGb contained: 
P(C2-Cl) 
P(s-c.) 
P(S-C2) 
= 
= 
= 
ql 
q2 
1 
1 
1 
Define 
In our example, we inherited a defeasible (default) 
value for the probability of H for the conditioning 
class s from the most specific conditioning class ci 
for which we had a hard value for the probability of 
H. 
The "Default Inheritance" Principle: 
Let P(HIS) denote the probability of some 
hypothesis H of interest, given the situation 
S at hand. Suppose our hard information 
A consists only of values for the probability 
of H, conditional on various propositions 
Ci which form a chain. Then in order 
to conclude a defeasible value for P(HIS), 
we look for the most specific C; such 
that s-C;, and make P(HIS) equal to 
P(HIC;). 
The structure of this sort of non-monotonic rea­
soning is analogous to that of default inheritance in 
categorical reasoning, e.g. in the classic exa�ple �f 
whether birds and ostriches fly. In default mherl­
tance, a particular class S inherits an attribute A 
from the most specific class C; of a chain of S's super­
classes { Ci} for which information about A is avail­
able. In the categorical case of default inheritance, 
the attribute is inherited with certainty, e.g. Flies 
or else -.Flies. We can represent this as inheriting 
either P(A ) = 0 or else P(A) = 12. The "default 
inheritance" type of non-monotonic reasoning with 
probabilities corresponds to inheriting the probability 
P(A) of the attribute, which is not always 0 or 1. 
2We have considered here only binary attributes, but the 
property of certainty holds for n-ary attributes as well 
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Thus it can be formalized as a generalization of the 
usual default inheritance. Alternatively, we can think 
of it as inheriting with certainty an attribute which 
is a probability, e.g. P(H) above. 
5 Specificity-Prioritized 
Maximization of Conditional 
Independence 
We can formulate our non-monotonic example in 
terms of (non-monotonically inferred) conditional 
independence statements. Let C I G( { x, y}, z )3 mean 
that the propositions x and y are conditionally 
independent given the proposition z, i.e. that: 
P((x 1\ y)jz) = P(xlz)P(yjz) 
which is equivalent {when P(xiz) ::/: 0) to: 
P(xj(y 1\ z)) = P(xlz) 
; and (when P(yjz) ::/: 0) to: P(yj(x 1\ z)) = P(yjz) 
Since P((S-Ci)) = 1 for i = 1, 2 : 
P(S =. (S 1\ Ci)) = 1 
Thus (5) is equivalent to: 
P(HI(S 1\ Cl)) = P(HIC1) ; i.e., CIG({H, S},C1). 
Similarly, (6) is equivalent to: 
P(HI(S 1\ C2)) = P(HIC2); i.e., GIG( {H, S}, C2) 
Note that after (4), because P(HIC2) differs from 
P(HIC1), CIG({H,S},C2) and CIG({H,S},C1) 
cannot hold simultaneously. In effect, we have a 
competition and conflict between the two. According 
to the "default inheritance" principle, we try to non­
monotonically conclude at least one of the two, and 
GIG( {H, S}, C2) takes precedence when (as after (4), 
though not before (4)) there is conflict. Thus we can 
formulate the precedence of more specific information 
as a priority among default conditional independence 
statements. 
We propose formulating the "default inheritance" 
principle as the Specificity-Prioritized Maximiza­
tion of Conditional Independence (SPMCI). That 
is, given some hard probabilistic axioms, we non­
monotonically conclude conditional independence 
statements corresponding to inheritance chains. (If 
such conditional independence statements are incon­
sistent with the given hard axioms, then as usual with 
3Here {x,y} is a set not a tuple, since CIG({x,y},z) is 
symmetric in x - y. It is also useful to d��e the c.�e of mutual independence among a set of n propos1t1ons conditional 
on z, but we will not take the space here. 
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defaults we block them as conclusions.) In case of the 
sort of conflict above, we apply precedence based on 
specificity in the above sense. 
An important (and open) question is which con­
ditional independence statements to maximize. We 
may only want to apply the "default inheritance" 
principle to some hypotheses Hk and some chains 
Cf and situations sm. If we are only interested in 
inheriting a default value the way we did above for 
the probability of a particular H conditional on a 
particular S, then it appears we need consider only 
GIG tuples ( {u, v }, w} such that H or ....,fl is in {u, v} 
and P(S-w) = 1. 
6 Non-Monotonicity in "Evidential" 
Reasoning 
An important type of probabilistic reasoning in AI 
has been what we will call "evidential" reasoning, in 
which we are given hard information about P(HIE;) 
for each of several E; 's. Importantly, no E; subsumes 
any other, though they may (and ususally do) 
overlap. They do not form a chain. By making the 
assumptions of conditional independence of the E; 's 
given both H and given -.H, one can then infer a 
value for 
P(Hj(E1 A ... A En)) 
(E.g., see PROSPECTOR [2], as well as MYCIN and 
Dempster-Shafer (4}.) 
6.1 "Default Inheritance" 
Typically, this value for P(HI(El 1\ • • .  1\ En)) is in 
effect combined (rather implicitly) with the "default 
inheritance" principle to yield non-monotonically a 
value for P(HIS), when (S is the situation at hand 
and) we believe with certainty that: 
and when S implies no other Ej's for which P(HIEj) 
is available. This step corresponds to an application 
of SPMCI; more specific conjunctions of the E; 's take 
precedence. 
6.2 "Soft-Coding" Assumptions 
A problem with "evidential" reasoning schemes is 
that the conditional independence assumptions of the 
E; 's given H and given -.H are often too strong: 
there are so many such assumptions that they are 
inconsistent either with each other, or with given 
(hard) information about the probability of H given 
conjunctions of various E;'s. We observe that MCI 
can be used to make such assumptions by default. 
Past approaches have been to "hard-code" or "build" 
such assumptions into the probabilistic inference ma­
chinery in a way which is monotonic and thus fre­
quently inconsistent. "Soft-coding" via defeasibility 
retains the advantages (conceptual simplicity, repre­
sentational parsimony, and computational ea8e) af­
forded by making the assumptions, to the greatest 
extent possible without sacrificing consistency and 
expressiveness. We can regard this as maximizing, 
rather than inflexibly assuming, a sort of "modular­
ity" or "locality". 
Another issue in evidential reasoning is that often 
P( E; IS) is uncertain rather than certain. In such 
cases, commonly (e.g. in PROSPECTOR [7)) the 
assumption is made that for each of several EJ�c 
representing most specific conjunctive formulae in the 
E; 's and their negations: 
P(HI(EJ�c 1\ S)) = P(HIEJ�c) 
i.e. that: 
GIG( {H, S}, EJ�c) 
Of course this assumption may be inconsistent with 
other hard information. In particular, the presump­
tion that it is consistent in practice seems to have 
been made by implicitly limiting what sorts of prob­
abilistic information will be present, i.e. can be ex­
pressed, in the AI system making this assumption [8]. 
If we "soft-code" this assumption as a "default inher­
itance" step, then we can avoid the choice between 
expressive limitation and inconsistency. 
7 Graphoids, Influence Diagrams, 
and Irrelevance 
Recently both the AI and the Decision Analysis re­
search communities have developed interest in the 
idea of reasoning about the structure of ( condi­
tional) dependencies and independencies among a 
complexly-related collection of probabilistic events, in 
a fashion abstracted from the details of the particular 
underlying probabilistic values It appears that espe­
cially for humans it is a natural and helpful way to 
factor probabilistic reasoning. This makes it impor­
tant for explanation, justification, and validation of 
probabilistic reasoning, and suggests that there may 
be computational advantages as well. 
One direction of this research is represented by 
influence diagrams [6]. Influence diagrams implic­
itly specify conditional independencies by omission 
of "links" representing conditional probability state­
ments (constraints). This suggests the use of a non­
monotonic specification convention for influence di­
agrams: a sort of "closed dependency" assumption 
analogous to the "closed world assumption" familiar 
in categorical reasoning. 
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A related direction of research is the alternative 
formulation of conditional independence provided by 
the abstraction of Graphoids [16]4• A Graphoid is 
the theory of a trinary relation, I(x, z, y), which 
we can take to denote GIG( {x, y}, z), but with the 
additional generality that x, y, and z denote (non­
intersecting) sets of propositions. Informally, 
denotes 
J\ I({a;},{ck},{bj}) 
i,j,lc 
; and I( {at}, { cl:} , {bj}) denotes GIG( {a;, bi }, Ck). 
As with influence diagrams, we can imagine em­
ploying non-monotonic reasoning about Graphoids, 
e.g. as a specification convention. MCI in terms 
of Graphoids is the maximization of the I relation. 
Thus given partial constraints on the relation I, we 
might non-monotonically conclude additional positive 
literals in I. 
Another 
way to think about conditional (in)dependence is in 
terms of (ir)relevance. GIG({x,y},z) means that 
given z, learning y is irrelevant to our estimate of the 
probability of x; and vice versa, that given z, learning 
x is irrelevant to our estimate of the probability 
of y. MCI then corresponds to the non-monotonic 
maximization of irrelevance. This has a flavor of 
maximizing simplicity in the sense of Occam's Razor. 
The more that we can decide is irrelevant to some 
problem-soving task, the easier that task becomes; 
thus maximization of irrelevance holds out the ul­
timate promise of substantial computational advan­
tages if that maximization itself is not too complex. 
8 A Circumscriptive Formalization of 
(SP)MCI 
We can try to formalize MCI in a variety of 
formalisms for non-monotonic reasoning, e.g. Cir­
cumscription [12,13], Default Logic (17], or Non­
Monotonic Modal Logic (14]. However, we also want 
to express the precedence of more specific information 
in the sense discussed earlier. For this purpose, a 
recently-developed version of Circumscription, called 
Pointwise Circumscription [11], is most apt. In it, 
we can conveniently express priorities among the var­
ious defaults corresponding to particular conditional 
independence statements. 
We lack space to go into the details here of 
circumscription and its pointwise version. The 
following treatment is necessarily rather schematic. 
4 Below we follow their notation 
Circumscription accomplishes non-monotonic rea­
soning from a base theory B by applying the (mono­
tonic) theory-closure of classical second-order logic 
to B augmented by an additional second-order cir­
cumscription axiom which is formed from B accord­
ing to a circumscription policy specifying the non­
monotonic behavior. The circumscription axiom ex­
presses the minimality of a predicate. 
We now sketch a proposed method to construct an 
appropriate B and policy to accomplish (SP)MCI. 
We are currently investigating a number of unresolved 
outstanding technical issues involved in proving that 
the following indeed accomplishes its intended effect. 
Let 8o (e.g. {A) U LOGb U AXPROB}) be our 
"base" theory consisting of given, monotonic (hard), 
probabilistic axioms (both certain and uncertain), 
e.g. P(G2-C1) = 1 ; P(HIG1) = .15 ; etc .. 8o is 
in a first-order language .Cm. 
In terms of pointwise circumscription, we can ex­
press MCI via the circumscription, i.e. minimization, 
of an introduced abnormality predicate AB charac­
terized by the following axiom which we add to 8o 
to form 8. (By employing a slight variant of circum­
scription, which we dub "hyperscription", in which 
predicates are maximized rather than minimized, we 
can actually avoid the need to introduce an AB and 
the following axiom. We just maximize GIG directly. 
However the following formulation will be easier for 
most readers to follow.) 
-.AB( {x, y}, z)=?GIG( {x, y}, z) 
We can express MCI via a pointwise circumscription 
axiom(11]: 
GAB(8; AB/VAB, PfVp, GIG/Vera) 
This says that AB is minimized in the theory 8, with 
the predicates AB and GIG and the function P being 
variable respectively when (the newly-introduced 
predicates) VAB, Vera, and Vp hold. 
Two interesting sorts of questions about MCI are: 
which tuples ({x,y},z} to try to presume by default; 
and with what priorities. Pointwise circumscription 
gives us a way to specify these in some detail. We can 
express via VAB both the delimitation of the scope 
of MCI, and the priorities among various conditional 
independence (CI) defaults. 
VAB(({u,v},w},({r,s},t)) means that when min­
imizing AB (i.e. maximizing GIG) at tuple 
( { u, v}, w}, the tuple ( { r, s}, t} is variable. To specify 
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that we want MCI to apply to a particular tuple 
({a,b},c), we include in B the axiom: 
VAB ( { {a, b}, c), { {a, b}, c)) (8) 
If (8) is absent from Th2(B), e.g. if its negation is 
present, then MCI will not apply to that tuple. 
To specify that the CI default on tuple ({a,b},c) 
has greater priority than the CI default on tuple 
({d,e},/}, we include in B the axiom: 
VAe(({a, b}, c), ({d, e},/)) 
Thus we can write a general Specificity-Prioritization 
Axiom: 
vc1, c2.(P(C2-c1) = 1):::::? 
(Vx, y.VAB( ({x, y}, C2), ({x, y}, Ct) )) 
We can imagine specifying other kinds of prioriti­
zations among CI defaults as well. We may wish to 
infer some CI defaults before considering others. We 
can do so by making the former have higher priority, 
i.e. be relatively "harder". 
Thus in pointwise circumscription we can5 express 
Maximization of Conditional Independence with 
and without Specificity-Prioritization ((SP)MCI), re­
stricted to arbitrary collections of tuples. and with 
arbitrary priorities among the CI defaults. 
9 Maximum Entropy 
So far we have discussed two major types of 
non-monotonic probabilistic reasoning: "default 
inheritance" (formulable as SPMCI) and default 
locality /irrelevance/ laraphoid (formulable as MCI). A 
third type of non-monotonic probabilistic reasoning 
is the use of the Maximum Entropy assumption, 
which has attracted considerable attention in the AI 
community (e.g. [9,7,1,15,3]) 
Maximum Entropy (ME) is a method of selecting 
a non-monotonic extension of given ("base") hard 
axioms B. The base axioms are treated as a set of 
constraints on the maximization of the entropy of the 
joint probability distribution P(F): 
- L P(F;)log(P(F;)) 
F;E:F 
ME always produces a unique, complete extension. 
By "complete", we mean that every P(W;IWi) has a 
unique single real value in the ME extension: the 
lower conditional probability distribution on W is 
equal to the upper probability distribution. 
5see the caveat above 
Intuitively, ME tries to "flatten" the joint distribu­
tion P(:F). In the extremal case, i.e. if the base theory 
is empty, then the result of ME is that each P(F;) is 
the same as every other. This is sometimes called the 
uniform prior, or LaPlacian prior, assumption. 
ME often non-monotonically entails a large number 
of conditional independence statements. It has 
some elegant properties in this regard. A well­
known result [10] is the Product Extension Theorem, 
which partially characterizes the sorts of conditional 
independence statements produced by ME, in terms 
of propositional subspaces. 
A natural question is the relationship between ME 
and (SP)MCI. 
Clearly they are not in general identical. Consider 
the case of an empty base theory. Here ME 
entails a uniform distribution, while (SP)MCI entails 
only conditional independence constraints which are 
satisfiable by non-uniform distributions. Also, in 
general (SP)MCI does not entail a unique, complete 
extension: e.g. it may result in bounds on, rather 
than point values for, some probabilities. 
An interesting open question we are investigating 
is how fully to characterize the sort of conditional 
independence statements produced by ME, including 
in relation to specificity-prioritization. 
10 Discussion 
(SP)MCI appears to represent several important 
kinds of non-monotonicity in probabilistic reasoning. 
SPMCI can express the commonly-found "default 
inheritance" principle. We can use MCI as a spec­
ification convention for Graphoids or influence dia­
grams. We can use MCI to maximize irrelevance in a 
particular sense. MCI also promises to provide a tool 
to specify the presumption of "locality" of updating 
in the sense of "evidential" reasoning. MCI overlaps 
substantially with Maximization of Entropy (ME). 
Compared to ME, it is a more precisely controllable 
assumption. It separates the assumption of maxi­
mizing conditional independence from the uniform 
prior assumption; ME conflates the two. SPMCI 
can yield a non-monotonic theory with bounds, not 
just point values, for probabilities. Moreover, we can 
specify in much greater detail the tuples to which 
to. apply MCI and SP. Hopefully that this will carry 
over to more control and goal-directedness in com­
putation as well. Current ME algorithms are global, 
numerical relaxation procedures which calculate the 
entire joint probability distribution. It is thus often 
impracticably costly to apply the ME assumption. 
An open challenge is to make any of these three types 
of non-monotonic probabilistic reasoning reasonably 
efficient. One important criterion we might want to 
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impose is that the non-monotonic conclusions about 
GIG be definite. 
As usual with non-monotonic reasoning, there are 
at least two sorts of intepretations or justifications 
for adopting a non-monotonic theory-closure prin­
ciple. One is as a representational or specification 
convention. Another is as a conjectural decision rule. 
Due to lack of space, we have concentrated here more 
on the form rather than on the pragmatic substance 
of non-monotonicity in probabilistic reasoning. One 
interesting lead we are investigating is the basis in 
Bayesian statistical estimation and decision theory 
for what we have called the "default inheritance" 
principle. 
11 Conclusion 
Probabilistic Logic casts monotonic probabilistic rea­
soning in terms of monotonic categorical reasoning 
with probabilistic statements. We extended this 
approach, and cast non-monotonic probabilistic rea­
soning in terms of non-monotonic categorical reason­
ing. We identified a type of non-monotonic prob­
abilistic reasoning, akin to default inheritance in 
categorical reasoning, that seems to be commonly 
found in practice. We formulated this as a principle: 
Specificity-Prioritized Maximization of Conditional 
Independence (SPMCI). We then identified another 
interesting type of non-monotonic probabilistic rea­
soning, akin to default irrelevancy, and showed that 
it can be formulated and formalized in similar terms: 
as Maximization of Conditional Independence (MCI). 
We formalized (SP)MCI using Pointwise Circum­
scription, a recently developed variant of the circum­
scription formalism for (categorical) non-monotonic 
reasoning. We noted the Maximum Entropy assump­
tion as a third type of non-monotonic probabilistic 
reasoning, and compared it to (SP)MCI. 
12 Directions for Future Research 
The main intent of this paper is to help to define and 
provoke an area of investigation. We have offered 
more conjectures and suggestions than answers. 
Several open questions about (SP)MCI were men­
tioned in passing. When, i.e. for which tuples, do we 
want to do MCI? Are there additional sorts of prior­
itizations besides SP which are desirable or useful? 
(Our preliminary investigations indicate that it is 
often undesirable to perform indiscriminate MCI, and 
that prioritization beyond specificity is sometimes de­
sirable.) When and to what extent does MEr :uce 
MCI? Insofar as ME produces MCI, is it compatible 
with SP? Are there ways to employ (SP)MCI in 
relatively efficiently in goal-directed computations, 
RF.FF.RF.Nr.F.� 
i.e. without computing the entire lower probability 
distribution non-monotonically entailed by SPMCI? 
Does our proposed circumscriptive formalization of 
(SP)MCI have its intended models? 
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